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ROPONENTS of legislation to induce or require
more banks to be members of the Federal Reserve
System often argue that the existence of nonmember
commercial banks creates problems for the conduct of
monetary policy. Two of the most frequently men-
tioned of these problems are: First, the ratio of net
demand deposits to bank reserves may become more
variable as nonmember banks have a larger share of
demand deposit liabilities.1 Second, as banks with-
draw from membership, the average ratio of net de-
mand deposits to reserves rises. With a lower average
reserve base, fluctuations in reserves due to such
factors as changes in float and currency holdings of the
public make net demand deposits more variable.2
These potential problems have been subjected to ex-
tensive theoretical analysis.
Recently, a third possible problem with declining
membership has been suggested — the fact that non-
member banks do not have access to the discount
window on a day-to-day basis. Lack of direct access
to the discount window for all commercial banks, it
has been alleged, may preclude the adoption of appro-
priate monetary policy because of the Federal Re-
serve’s concern about the differential impacts of these
policies on member and nonmember banks. During
periods of tight monetary policy, for example, decin-
1Dennis R. Starleaf, “Nonmember Banks and Monetary Con-
trol,” Journal of Finance (September 1975), pp. 955-75; and
Kenneth J. Kopecky, “Nonmember Banks and Empirical
Measures of the Variability of Reserves and Money: A Theo-
retical Analysis,” Journal of Finance (March 1978), pp. 311-
18.
2
See, for example, J. A. Cacy, “Reserve Requirements and
Monetary Control,” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
MonthlyReview (May 1976), pp. 3-13~
ing Federal Reserve membership might increase the
liquidity risk for the entire banking system, since
fewer banks would be able to use the discount win-
dow to provide a temporary offset to unexpected
reserve outflows.~
The validity of this argument hinges on whether
credit from the discount window significantly would
help nonmember banks adjust to deposit withdrawals.
Under existing legislation, the Federal Reserve has the
authority to lend to nonmember banks in unusual
emergencies in which these banks would fail without
additional reserves.4 Increasing the number of banks
that are members, therefore, would not increase the
ability of the Federal Reserve to respond to such
emergency situations.
3G. William Miller, “Statement,” Monetary Control and the
Membership Problem, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on
Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 95th Congress, 2nd Ses-
sion, July 27, 1978, pp. 60-62; and statements by Sen. William
Proxmire and Paul Volcker, Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board, before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Hous-
ing, and Urban Aifairs, February 4, 1980.
~Creditfrom Federal Reserve Banks is classified as reserve ad-
justment credit, seasonal credit, and emergency credit. Adjust-
ment credit is available for member banks to meet unexpected
temporary credit demands caused by sudden deposit with-
drawals or unanticipated loan demand. Seasonal credit is avail-
able to relatively small member banks that have seasonal
pattems in their deposits and loans. Emergency credit may be
made available to member or nonmember banks with severe
financial difficulties. For additional infonnatfon on the condi~
tions under which the Federal Reserve makes credit available
to banks, see R. Alton Gilbert, “Benefits of Borrowing from
the Federal Reserve when the Discount Rate is Below Market
Interest Rates,” this Review (March 1979), pp. 25-32. This
paper analyzes use of adjustment credit by member banks.
For an analysis of seasonal borrowing, see Stanley L. Graham,
“Is the Fed’s Seasonal Borrowing Privilege Justified?” Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review (Fall 1979),
pp.9-14.
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The type of monetary policy that the Federal Re-
serve may be precluded from adopting out of concern
for liquidity pressures on noumember banks is pre-
sumably not that designed to create liquidity emer-
gencies for the banking system. Concern that declin-
ing membership would increase liquidity risk to the
banking system suggests, rather, that nonmember
banks have greater difficulty than member banks in
adjusting to unanticipated deposit withdrawals or
changes in demands for credit in more normal cir-
cumstances than those emergencies in which the~
Federal Reserve would make credit available to non-
member banks. Since monetary policymakers are jus-
tifiably concerned about possible influences of Federal
Reserve membership on the conduct of monetary
policy, it is important to clarify whether lack of direct
access to the discount window for nonmember banks
does, indeed, pose a serious problem for monetary
policy.
This article takes an indirect approach to determin-
ing whether nonmember banks have greater reserve
management difficulties due to lack of access to the
discount window. If borrowing from the discount
window is a useful way to adjust to unanticipated
reserve outflows, member banks would borrow from
the discount window on at least a few occasions each
year, taking advantage of their regular, reliable, day-
to-day access to the discount window to meet unex-
pected withdrawals or to cushion themselves against
temporary liquidity pressures. If, however, most mem-
ber banks manage their reserve positions without
borrowing at the discount window, it is doubtful that
nonmember banks have significantly greater difficulty
than members in responding to similar reserve out-
flows. In this case, lack of access to the discount win-
dow for nonmember banks is simply irrelevant to the
membership issue.
DO MEMBER BANKS BORROW
FREQUENTLY FROM THE
DISCOUNT WINDOW?
Most member banks do not borrow from the dis-
count window; those few that do so generally bor-
row infrequently. From 1974 to 1977, the proportion
of the 430 member banks in the Eighth District that
borrowed in any one year was as high as 25 percent
only in 1974, when the discount rate was substantially
below alternative short-term interest rates.5 Of the 115
member banks that borrowed during 1974, only 21
5
For further discussion of member bank borrowing, see Gilbert,
“Benefits of Borrowing from the Federal Reserve.”
did so on more than 10 occasions, and only 55 bor-
rowed five or more times (table 1)~During 1975,
only nine banks borrowed five times or more, and in
1976 only 10 banks borrowed that frequently.
The infrequent borrowing of member banks from
the Federal Reserve indicates that, in most circum-
stances, they adjust to reserve losses without resort
to the discount window. This is sufficient evidence for
rejecting the view that nonmember banks necessarily
have greater problems than member banks in coping
with reserve outflows because they lack direct access
to the discount window. If borrowing from the dis-
count window were an important means for banks to
adjust their reserve positions to reserve outflows, most
member banks would borrow from the discount win-
dow.7 Yet, they do not do so.
HOW DO MEMBER BANKS ADJUST
TO RESERVE DRAINS?
Most member banks manage their reserve positions
by means other than borrowing at the discount win-
dow. This has implications for the significance of the
discount window for the banking system’s operation.
Effects of Deposit Fluctuations on the
Reserve Positions of Member Banks
Cash management by member banks is investigated
by considering the factors that determine their de-
sired cash holdings, the types of events that cause
their cash holdings to be different from desired levels,
6
Although Reserve Banks classify borrowing by member banks
as reserve adjustment or seasonal credit, it is often difficult
to distinguish the purpose of borrowing in actual practice.
Member banks that have the privilege of receiving seasonal
credit often change the amount of seasonal credit they borrow
daily or weekly, Use of the discount window for reserve
adjustment is gauged in this article by the number of occa-
sions on which a bank borrows from the discount window
during a year, measured as the number of times when
borrowing is positive followed by periods when borrowing
is zero. Member banks that use the discount window for
reserve adjustment on a routine basis tend to borrow on
several occasions each year.
~Tbis conclusion is reinforced by noting that Fed reserve re-
quirements are binding for most member banks, in the sense
that they hold larger cash balances than they would in the
absence of Fed reserve requirements, whereas state reserve
requirements are not binding for most nonmember banks, In
most states, required cash reserves of nonmernber banks are
substantially smaller than the cash reserves nonmember banks
actually hold. See R. Alton Gilbert, “Effectiveness of State Re-
serve Requirements,” this Review (September 1978), pp. 16-
28. If most member banks do not borrow at the discount win-
dow to offset reserve drains in order to meet binding reserve
requirements, nonmember banks would be even less likely to
borrow at the discount window, if made available to them,
unless they were made subject to member bank reserve
requirements.
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Table 1
Frequency of Borrowing from the Federal Reserve by Member Banks
Bank ~ Number of Eighth District member banks that borrowed n~~r
(Total deposits in on the following number of occasions each year of banks
millions of dollars) 1 2-4 5-10 11-15 16-20 Over 20 borrowing
1974
$0-SlO 7 8 7 600 3 0
10- 25 14 21 80 1 04 4
25- 50 3 2 11 200 16
50- 100 2 1 4 1 0 1 9
OverlOO 114233 14
1975
$0-SW 22 1 0 1 0 6
10- 25 2 8 110 0 12
25- 50 64 1100 12
50- 100 3 2001 06
OverlOO 420200 6
1976
$0-SiC 22 1100 6
10- 25 4 0 1100 6
25- 50 2 350 00 1 0
50- 100 110 0 1 0 3
OverlOO 4 4 0000 6
1977
$0-Sb 1 5 1 0 0 1 8
10- 25 3 440 1 01 2
25- 50 5 63300 17
50- 100 2 420 00 6
OverlOO 257 3 1 01 6
and their response to deviations of actual Irom (Ic- are determined by both the vulwIW of transactions
sired cash balances. Cash balances of member banks through those accounts and the balances their corres-
can be classified into three components: vault cash, pondents require as compensation for services pro-
reserve balances at Federal Reserve Banks, and vided. Correspondent banks generally do not charge
demand balances due from correspondents. respondents explicit fees for services; they require,
instead, that respondents hold certain average de-
The amount of vault cash banks desire to hold is mand balances with them.8
based upon their expectations of depositors’ demand
for currency. Reserve balances held by most member The primary cause of deviation be~veena bank’s
banks at the Federal Reserve are determined by actual and desired cash balances is unanticipated flue-
their required reserve balances, which are based tuation in demand deposit liabilities. Time depos-
upon their deposit liabilities and vault cash held two its mature on specific dates, and therefore bank man-
weeks earlier. Required reserve balances change each agement can anticipate when it must be ready to
week, and member banks must meet their required
reserves on a weekly average basis. Finally demand
8
Robert E. Knight, “correspondent Ban~sgPart III: Account
Analysis,” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas Gity Monthly
balances of member banks due from correspondents Review (December 1971), pp. 3-17.
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make payments to holders of time deposits. Demand
deposit liabilities, however, fluctuate more from day
to day and are, therefore, more difficult to estimate,
The effects of unanticipated loan demand on
banks’ reserve positions are reflected in changes in
their demand deposit liabilities. When banks make
loans, they increase the demand deposit balances of
borrowers. Tf borrowers did not withdraw those de-
posits to make payments, there would be no dis-
turbance in the current week to the reserve positions
of banks making loans. Increases in loans cause banks
to lose reserves only when borrowers withdraw
deposits.
Bank customers withdraw deposits from their de-
mand accounts either by demanding currency or by
writing checks. When depositors demand currency, a
bank’s assets (vault cash) and liabilities (demand
deposits) decrease simultaneously. Member banks
lose reserves when depositors demand currency, but
due to lagged reserve accounting, this decline in
vault cash does not affect reserves available to meet
reserve requirements in the current week. Likewise,
the decline in demand deposit liabilities that results
when depositors demand currency does not affect
required reserves in the current settlement week, but
two weeks later instead.9 Therefore, member banks
may choose to make no initial response to a loss of
reserves in the form of vault cash, unless total vault
cash falls below some critical level at which the risks
of temporary currency shortages become sufficiently
great.
When customers withdraw demand deposits by
writing checks, the effect on a member bank’s cash
assets depends upon how the bank clears checks and
how it pays for checks drawn on its customers’ ac-
counts. Banks receive checks as their customers make
deposits and, therefore, need a mechanism for collect-
ing checks drawn on other banks. Some member
banks receive payment for checks by having their
reserve balance at their Reserve Bank credited, while
paying for checks drawn on their depositors’ accounts
by having their reserve balances debited. Frequent
debits and credits to member banks’ reserve accounts
cause these balances to change on most business days.
9
Required reserves of a member bank in the current settlement
week are based upon its deposit liabilities two weeks earlier.
The reserves that count toward meeting a member bank’s
required reserves in the current settlement week are average
daily vault cash held two weeks earlier and average daily
reserve balances at the Fed in the current week. For a com-
parison of how contemporaneous and lagged resen’e account-
ing affects the reserve management of member banks, see R.
Alton Gilbert, “The Effects of Lagged Reserve Requirements
on the Reserve Adjustment Pressure on Banks,” Financial
Analysts Journal (September-October 1973), pp. 34-43,
If a member bank clears checks through its reserve
account, net withdrawals of deposit liabilities cause
its reserve balance to decline. Required reserves for
the current week, however, are not affected by de-
posit withdrawals in the current week due to lagged
reserve requirements. Thus, if its initial reserve bal-
ance just equaled its required balance for the cur-
rent week, deposit withdrawals during the week
would cause a member bank’s reserve balance to be
deficient. Borrowing through the discount window is
one means of increasing reserves on short notice.
Other member banks clear checks through their bal-
ances at correspondents. They deposit checks with
their correspondents and pay for checks drawn on
depositors’ accounts by having their demand bal-
ances due from correspondents debited, including
checks presented for payment by the Federal Reserve.
If these banks do not use other Reserve Bank services
that cause their reserve balances to change, these
balances would change only when banks adjusted
them to equal their required reserve balances.1°Thus,
the reserve balances of member banks that use serv-
ices of correspondents tend to change less frequently
than those of member banks that make greater use
of Reserve Bank services.
For a member bank that clears checks through a
correspondent bank, net withdrawals of deposit liabil-
ities would not disrupt its balance between actual and
required reserves for the current week. The decline in
demand deposit liabilities instead would affect the
bank’s required reserves in coming weeks. Since
checks are cleared through the bank’s correspondent
account, its reserve balance is unaffected by net
deposit withdrawals.
The response of these member banks to deposit
withdrawals depends upon the constraints placed on
them by their correspondents. If respondent banks
were required to hold certain minimum amounts of
demand balances at correspondents on a weekly av-
erage basis, they occasionally svould have to obtain
additional cash balances when experiencing net with-
drawals of deposit liabilities. Studies of correspondent
banking, however, indicate that respondent banks may
average their balances over longer periods of time,
such as a quarter or even a year, in meeting the bal-
ance requirements of correspondents.h1 Respondent
10Use of the following Reserve Bank services may involve
debits and credits to reserve balances: wire transfers, coin
and currency shipments, and collection of coupons on secur-
ities held in safekeeping and matured securities.
15
Knight, “Correspondent Banking.”
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banks may have enough flexibility in managing their
cash positions to simply let their demand balances due
from correspondents fluctuate as their deposit liabil-
ities fluctuate with no additional response to deposit
outflows.
One method of determining whether respondent
banks may temporarily reduce their demand balances
due from correspondents by amounts equal to short-
term deposit outflows is to compare the dollar magni-
tude of changes in demand deposit liabilities to
changes in their demand balances due from corre-
spondents. When large decreases in demand balances
due from correspondents were compared to large de-
creases in gross demand deposit liabilities for 95 mem-
ber banks that obtain most of their services through
correspondents, the ratio of the former to the latter
averaged 1.04.12 Thus, large weekly decreases in de-
mand balances due from correspondents are of ap-
proximately the same dollar magnitude as large
weekly decreases in gross demand deposits. These re-
sults indicate that respondents have enough short-
term flexibility in managing their cash positions that
they can cope with relatively large decreases in their
gross demand deposit liabilities by letting their de-
mand balances due from correspondents decline
temporarily.
Are Demand Deposit Withdrawals Large
Enough to Induce Banks to Borrow?
Only those member banks that clear checks through
their reserve accounts have reductions in their re-
FEBRUARY 1980
serve balances when experiencing net demand de-
posit outflows. These are the banks, therefore, that
tend to borrow frequently from the discount window.
Even for those banks that use their reserve balances
for clearing checks, however, fluctuations in demand
deposit liabilities may not be large enough to induce
them to borrow to avoid reserve deficiencies. If fluc-
tuations in their reserve balances are smaller than
their normal excess reserves, no response to declines
in demand deposit liabilities is necessary.
This issue is investigated by comparing average ex-
cess reserves to large decreases in demand deposit
liabilities for a group of 102 member banks that make
extensive use of Reserve Bank services.m The fifth
largest weekly decrease in gross demand deposits
was larger than their average excess reserves in 1976
for all but one of these banks. Those relatively large
decreases in deposits were, on the average, about
60 times larger than average excess reserves.14 There-
fore, excess reserves could not fluctuate by as much
as demand deposits during at least several weeks each
year. When demand deposit liabilities decline by
relatively large amounts, member banks that clear
checks through their reserve accounts must obtain
additional reserves to avoid reserve deficiencies.
Do Frequent Borrowers Clear Checks
Through Their Reserve Accounts?
The next step is to determine whether member
banks that borrow from the discount window most
frequently are, in fact, primarily among those banks
that clear checks through their reserve accounts. A
reliable indicator of whether a member bank uses its
reserve balance for settlement in check collection is
the frequency of changes in its reserve balance from
day to day. Check collection is the only Reserve Bank
2
The 95 member banks, located in the Eighth District portions
of Illinois and Missouri, bad total deposits of less than $50
million in 1976. None of these banks cleared checks through
the Reserve Bank regularly. These banks had so little ac-
tivity in their reserve balances at the Fed that the dollar
amounts in their reserve balances remained unchanged for
150 days or more during 1976. Relatively large declines in
the demand deposit liabilities at individual banks are meas-
ured by calculating the changes in gross demand deposits
from each reserve settlement week to the next and deter-
mining the fifth largest decline. That amount is compared
to the fifth largest weekly decline in demand balances due
from correspondents, a measure of relatively large weekly
declines in balances due from correspondents, An altemntive
comparison would be of the greatest weekly decline in de-
mand deposit liabilities to the greatest weekly decline in de-
mand balances due from correspondents. Such compansons
were not reported because, for many banks, the greatest
weekly declines were substantially different from declines in
other weeks and, therefore, not representative of the rela-
tively large weekly declines in these series. Examination of
weekly declines in both series indicated that the fifth greatest
weekly declines tend to be fairly representative of large de-
clines. For instance, the third greatest weekly decline in
demand balances due from correspondents divided by the
third greatest decline in gross demand deposits averages
1.08.
l3The reserve balances of these member banks were unchanged
on no more than five business days during 1976.
~The ratio of the fifth largest weekly decline in gross demand
deposits to average excess reserves was higher for larger










sum ofthe fifth largest
Number weekly decrease in gross
of demand deposits divided by the






19FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS FEBRUARY 1980
Table 2
Comparison of the Frequency of Changes in Reserve Balances
of Frequent Borrowers and Other Member Banks’
Distribution of banks by the measure of frequency
of change in reserve balances at the Fed (Number
Size cate or of days during a year when a member bank’s reserve
(Annual average balances at the Fed were the same as on the previous day)
total deposits. Up to 116- 121- 131- 151- 176- 201- 251- 301 Number
millions of dollars) Type of bank 115 120 130 150 175 200 250 300 & Over of banks
$0-$10 Infrequent borrowers 3 2 4 335 18 87 53
Frequent borrowers in:




$10 -$25 Infrequent borrowers 17 7 9 8 10 5 14 10 2 82
Frequent borrowers in:




$25 -$50 Infrequent borrowers 15 5 5 4531 38
Frequent borrowers in:
1974 12 1 13
1975 2 2
1976 4 1 5
1977 6 6












I hank’ k~igiasttda’ frs’iii:ei,’ Inn fl)~~t’r~ale all l’.iglitli Di’Iriei THeI,Ih(r l,ank’ lint I,’sir,,wecl at the di’c:sinit wn,dow UT’
lit u:’ june u(’L’,LSl,si,’ r:ItTL,Lr It ~ , Lhi,~, (It’ igim~eIa, iulrcquent l,sn mU m’s are imiemuher I,ammk, iii thn F.ichth Dmstriet
portimin~oh Ihhmui~amid \tis,mnmmi that did mint lstmmm,;w at liii’ clm~t’msimul wimidmsw in Ii)TN amid “eTc m~mt irectmt’ui lmmsrrspaer,,
during 197i. 1975. or 1977.
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service that is likely to cause a member bank’s re-
serve balance to change each business day.15
The distribution of nonborrowers and frequent bor-
rowers by activity in their reserve balances is pre-
sented in table 2. Almost all of the Eighth District
member banks that borrowed on five or more occa-
sions per year in 1975-77 had changes in their reserve
balances on each business day. Incentive to borrow
from the discount window was relatively great during
1974 due to the large spread between market interest
rates and the discount rate. Several banks that bor-
rowed frequently in 1974 had relatively idle reserve
balances. More of the frequent borrowers during 1974,
however, had relatively active reserve balances than
nonborrowers of comparable size.’°Thus, evidence in
table 2 supports the hypothesis that banks which bor-
row frequently are primarily among those that have
relatively active reserve balances.
Why Are Only Some of the Member Banks
with Active Reserve Balances Frequent
Borrowers?
Fluctuations in deposit liabilities at member banks
that use correspondent services tend not to induce
frequent, short-term borrowings from the discount
window since those banks can adjust to decreases in
deposit liabilities by letting their balances at corres-
pondents decline temporarily. Thus, banks that use
services of correspondents may not be induced to
borrow from any source in response to relatively
large withdrawals of deposit liabilities. But among
member banks that clear checks through their re-
serve accounts, and consequently have frequent
changes in their reserve balances, why do some bar-
FEBRUARY 1980
row from the discount window frequently and others
never do?
One possible answer is that, among member banks
with relatively active reserve balances, the frequent
borrowers have more highly variable deposit liabil-
ities, and thus are induced to borrow from the dis-
count window more frequently to replace reserves
lost due to deposit withdrawals, Table 3 indicates that
frequent borrowers in the years 1975-77 tend to have
more highly variable demand deposit liabilities than
other banks of comparable size with similar activity
in their reserve balances)~
Another factor that might account for the difference
in frequency of borrowing is the difference in ratios
of loan to deposits. Banks with higher ratios of loan
to deposits tend to have smaller amounts of liquid as-
sets, which they can sell quickly to replace reserve
drains. Frequent borrowers had significantly higher
loan-to-deposit ratios in 1976; the difference was
positive, but not statistically significant at the 5 per-
cent level in 1977. Thus, there is some evidence that,
among the relatively small member banks with active
reserve balances, those that borrow frequently from
the discount window have higher ratios of loans to
depositsl8
Differences in federal funds positions might also
explain the varied use of the discount window by
banks with active reserve balances. Reserve balances
can be increased either by borrowing from the dis-
count window or by reducing federal funds sold to
correspondents. Loans in the federal funds market
15The relation between use of Fed services and frequency of
changes in reserve balances can be illustrated for member
banks in the Eighth District portions of Illinois and Missouri,
based on a survey of utilization of Fed services during
1976-77. Frequency of change in reserve balances is meas-
ured over 126 calendar days from mid-September 1976 to
snid-January 1977. The minimum number of days that a
member bank’s reserve balance would be unchanged during
that period is 39. For the 68 banks that deposited more
than five checks to their reserve balances during January
1977, reserve balances were unchanged an average of 39.9
days. A contrasting group is composed of 69 banks that
cleared no checks through the Fed and used the reserve
balances of their correspondents in remittin; for the Fed’s
cash letters and handling transactions with the Fed for coin
and currency. Their reserve balances remained unchanged
for an average of 75.6 days.
16
Among member banks with total deposits up to $50 millidn,
about 65 percent of the banks that borrowed frequently in
1974 had reserve balances that remained unchanged for
115 days or less, whereas only 20 percent of nonborrowers
had such active reserve balances.
‘~Thecharacteristics of member banks that borrowed from
the discount window on five or more occasions in 1974, but
were not frequent borrowers in the following three years,
were also compared to those of member banks with rela-
tively active reserve balances that did not borrow fre-
quently in any of the years 1974-1977. The banks that
borrowed frequently only during 1974 did not have greater
variability in their demand deposit liabilities than the other
banks. They did have higher ratios of loans to deposits than
nonborrowers. However, the banks that borrowed fre-
quently only during 1974 had such large proportions of their
assets invested in federal funds sold on average, and positive
net federal funds sold so often, that they were not induced
to borrow frequently from the discount window during the
following years. Analysis in table 3 is limited to banks with
total deposits up to $50 million because there were only
two frequent borrowers in 1975-77 with total deposits be-
tween $50 million and $100 million (average for 1976);
including those two banks in the analysis, and making com-
parisons to nonborrowers with total deposits up to $100
million might bias some of the comparisons in table 3.
18
A study of Tenth District member banks found that banks
wbich borrowed from the discount window had higher ratios
of loans to assets than nonborrowers of comparable size.
See J. A. Cacy, “Detenninants of Member Bank Borrow-
ing,” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Monthly Review
(February 1971), pp. 11-20.
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Table 3
Comparison of Frequent Borrowers and
Nonborrowers with Relatively Active Reserve Balances (1975-77)~
Frequent
Measure borrowers Nonborrowers2 Difference T-Statistic
Variability of demand deposits8 6.60% 4.82% 1.78% 2.0260
Percentage of average loans to average
total deposits
1976 61.81% 54.18% 7.63% 2.2991
1977 6371 58.52 5.19 1.5895
Number of weeks in which net federal funds
soldwas zero or negative
1976 20.44 7.98 12.46 35466
1977 2044 1064 980 27838
Average percentage of net federal funds
sold to total deposits~
1976 2 20% 5.87% 3.67% —2.2940
1977 232 5.41 —3.09 —2 1797
Number of banks 16 47
1Analysis is limited to banks with average total deposits m 1976 of less than $50 million dollars 2The reserve balances of these banks we e unchanged on no more than 120 days dii lug 1976.
3Variability of demand deposits is measured in the following way A bank’s demand deposit liabilities as of each bu mess day
are compared with as’ rag demand deposit liabilitie in the fis e previous business days and the percentage deviation of de-
p0 it of each day from the ft e day moving avera e i calculated. The tandard deviation of tho e percentage differences
(positive and negative signs retained) is cal ulated for each year as a measur of the day-to day variabthty of a banks
demand deposit habihtre * Fo interpretation of his measure s ppose a bank has a standard deviation of 5 percent. For
that bank the percentage deviations of demand deposit balances I om the fly day moving ave age would li within a range
5 percentage pmnt below and above the mean on about two-third of the days dunng the year Measuring depo it varia
hilitv with this tanda d d viation weight Ui measure toward the more extrem percentag d viations from the five-day
moving a erages, which is appropriate for a measnre that might be correlated with frequency of borrowing by banks to
avoid reserve deficiencies
4Net federal funds sold are counted as zero for weeks m which banks purchased more federal funds than they sold,
generally have maturities of one day, and, therefore, sold were zero or negative is significantly greater for
banks that sell federal funds can increase their frequent borrowers in both 1976 and 1977.
reserve balances quickly by reducing the amount of
federal funds they selL Federal Reserve regulations The other measure of federal funds position is aver-
do not permit member banks to receive reserve age federal funds sold as a percentage of average
adjustment credit through the discount window while total deposits, a measure of the cushion of liquidity
selling federal funds. Infrequent borrowers with a bank maintains in the form of federal funds sold.
active reserve balances may sell federal funds so often This percentage is significantly lower for frequent
that they are seldom permitted to borrow from the borrowers in both 1976 and 1977.
discount window.
Analysis of the charactenstics of banks that bor-
Two aspects of federal funds positions are analyzed row frequently from the discount window indicates
in table 3. One is the number of weeks during each that use of the discount window for reserve adjust-
year in which a bank’s net federal funds sold was ment is a valuable service for frequent borrowers.
zero or negative. A bank with positive net federal Banks that borrow frequently are among those
funds sold during most weeks tends to have few that make extensive use of Reserve Bank services.
occasions on which it would he induced to borrow. They tend to have greater short-term variability in
The niimber of weeks during which net federal funds their demand deposit liabilities and have higher
22Table 4
Variability of Demand Balances Due
to Commercial Banks and Private
Nonbank Depositors1
Measure of variability of demand
Annual average balances due to2
of demand balances t4onbank depositors
due to respondents Commercial other than the
(millions of dollars) banks U.S. government
(10 largest correspondent banks)










(Averages for 21 smaller correspondent banks)
$ 1.06 303% 5.1%
tmThese banks were elected from among all Eighth District
member banks that borrowed from the discount window
dunng 1976 and other Eighth District membe banks
in Illinois and Mi souri. A bank is assum d to be offering
correspondent err ces to o her bank if its demand bal
ances due to respondents are po itive each day and hange
each business day
2\ arjability of the e balances is measured b calculating
average halanc s for each re erve settlement week in 1976,
percentage chai ges in balances f om ea h week to the
ne t, and then taking the standard deviation of the per
centage change
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ratios of loans to deposits. In addition, net federal
funds sold, which are smaller on average and zero
more often than for other banks, indicate that they
substitute use of the discount window for holding
liquid assets,
Most member banks, however, prefer to adjust their
reserve positions to deposit fluctuations by methods
other than borrowing at the discount window. Among
relatively small member banks (those with total de-
posits less than $100 million), most clear checks
through correspondents. These banks can cope with
deposit fluctuations by allowing their demand bal-
ances due from correspondents to fluctuate, Of the
relatively small member banks that clear checks
through their reserve balances, most prefer to adjust
their reserve positions to deposit outflows by draw-
ing system that resulted from, or were compounded
Only a small minority of member banks borrow
from the discount window as a method of reserve
adjustment.
STABILITY OF THE CORRESPONDENT
BANKING SYSTEM
One of the reasons for creating the Federal Reserve
System was concern over liquidity crises of the bank-
ing system that resulted from, or were compounded
by, simultaneous demands for cash by respondent
banks from their correspondents. This concern might
still be relevant, given the continuing reliance of most
banks on correspondents for liquid balances.
Percentage changes from week to week in demand
balances of individual banks due from correspondents
are often quite large. Does it follow that demand
balances of correspondent banks due to respondents
are also highly variable from week to week? Are
correspondent banks vulnerable to liquidity problems
as a result of large fluctuations in their demand bal-
ances due to respondent banks?
The variability of total demand balances due to
respondents depends upon the size of the bank’s total
balances due to respondents (see table 4). For the
three largest correspondent banks, total demand
balances due to respondents are about as variable
as total demand deposit liabilities due to private non-
bank depositors. For smaller correspondent banks
those balances are more variable than their other
demand deposit liabilities. This contrast is greatest
for the 21 smallest correspondent banks: The meas-
ures of variability in their demand deposit liabilities
due to private mwnbank depositors were about the
same as for the larger correspondent banks, but bal-
ances due to respondents were substantially more
variable, Their demand balances due to respondents
were about as variable from week to week as de-
mand balances due from correspondents of individual
banks that clear checks through correspondents. For
95 member banks that obtain most of their services
through correspondents, the average measure of
weekly variability in their demand balances due from
correspondents is 29.5, which is approximately equal
to the average measure of variability in demand
balances due to respondents of 30.3 for the 21
smallest correspondent banks.19
lOVariability of demand balances of correspondents due to re-
spondents is measured as the standard deviation of percent-
age changes in those balances from week to week. Variability
of demand balances due from correspondents is measured
the same way. The 95 member banks which use correspond-
ent services are described in footnote 12.
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These comparisons indicate that the relatively large
correspondent banks have an advantage over smaller
correspondents in coping with the variability in de-
mand balances due to individual respondent banks.
For correspondents that serve the largest number of
respondent banks, fluctuations in balances due toindi-
vidual respondent banks tend to cancel each other
out, causing their total demand balances due to other
banks to be no more variable from week to week
than the sum of other demand deposit liabilities. Cor-
respondents that serve fewer respondents do not
benefit as much from such cancellation. Thus, the
largest correspondent banks are able to offer respond-
ents the service of reserve adjustment mechanisms
with no more vulnerability to occasional liquidity
problems resulting from fluctuations in their balances
due to respondents than that from fluctuations in bal-
ances due to nonbank depositors.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
It recently has been suggested that one adverse
effect of declining Federal Reserve membership is
that the Federal Reserve may become more reluctant
to pursue restrictive monetary policy because of its
uneven impact on the banking system. Nonmember
banks, without access to the discount window, might
not have the means to cope with liquidity pressures
resulting from restrictive monetary policy. Therefore,
extending access to the discount window to more
banks, by inducing or requiring more banks to be
members, would facilitate the implementation of
monetary policy.
The validity of this argument is investigated by
examining the frequency with which member banks
borrow at the discount window, If access to the dis-
count window helps banks adjust to occasional liquid-
ity pressures, most member banks would borrow
frequently from the discount window as a means of
coping with such pressures. Only a small minority of
member banks, however, actually borrows frequently
from the Federal Reserve. Therefore, while there are
valid reasons for suggesting that reductions in mem-
bership may interfere with monetary control, analysis
of reserve management by banks does not indicate
that direct access to the discount window for non-
member banks is important for the conduct of
monetary policy.
Many member banks adjust to declines in
their cash balances by letting their demand balances
due from correspondents decline temporarily. This
reaction is automatic for banks that clear checks
through correspondent balances. For banks that clear
checks through accounts at their Reserve Bank, net
withdrawals of deposit liabilities cause reductions in
their reserve balances, and may occasionally cause
reserve deficiencies unless offset. Banks that borrow
frequently at the discount window are among these
banks that clear checks through their reserve ac-
counts. Most member banks that clear checks through
reserve accounts, however, do not borrow frequently
from the discount window, but instead rely upon
federal funds sold to correspondents as a cushion of
liquidity, reducing federal funds sold when expe-
riencing reserve outflows.
The relatively large correspondent banks benefit
from offsetting fluctuations in the deposits due to in-
dividual respondent banks. Thus, large correspondent
banks can offer respondents means of adjusting their
cash positions to deposit fluctuations without incur-
ring any more variability in their own liabilities than
results from fluctuations in demand balances due to
nonbank customers. This indicates that correspondent
banks offer member and nonmember banks adequate
means of adjusting their cash position to fluctuations
in deposit liabilities.
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